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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court, in the course of its 
constitutional determination as to the admissibility of the 
earwitness identification testimony, erroneously admitted the 
voice-identification testimony of numerous state's witnesses; 
thereby depriving defendant of his constitutional rights to due 
process. The trial court's determination as to admissibility of 
the voice-identification testimony is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 942-43 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) . Defendant preserved this issue by moving 
to strike the voice-identification testimony of substantially all 
of the law enforcement witnesses utilized by the State at trial 
(See, e.g., R. 172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 428-29); 
2. Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to request 
a cautionary jury instruction that accurately reflected the Long-
factors to be considered in the course of evaluating voice-
identification testimony, deprived defendant of his 
6 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. To 
make such a showing, Defendant must show, first, that counsel 
rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1988) . Such claims present mixed questions of law and 
fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2070 (1984) . When available, the appellate court defers to 
the trial court's findings of fact, but reviews its application 
of legal principles to its factual findings for correctness. 
State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1993). Defendant need not 
preserve this issue inasmuch as it can be raised for the first 
time on appeal; 
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish 
Defendant's conviction of Attempted Escape. When reviewing a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, the 
appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict and 
"assumes the jury believed the evidence and inferences that 
support the verdict." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 
1993); see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In other 
words, the appellate court will affirm the jury verdict w/if 
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there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from 
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made.'" Wood, 868 P.2d at 87-88 (quoting State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)); see also State v. Hall, 
946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 
449 (Utah 1998) . Defendant preserved this issue by virtue of his 
opposition to the charge of Attempted Escape throughout the jury 
trial. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case, among other things, involves the question of 
whether the standards set forth for determining the reliability 
of eyewitness testimony also apply to earwitness testimony. 
Accordingly, this case involves the constitutional right of an 
accused to have the trial court determine the constitutional 
reliability of earwitness identifications prior to consideration 
of the same by a jury. 
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In the instant case, Defendant was alleged to have 
befriended another inmate, Mr. Calvin Slaugh, and, through the 
course of that relationship, to have obtained information by 
which Defendant attempted to be released from jail. Defendant 
was alleged to have utilized Mr. Slaugh's brother, Mr. Ralph 
Slaugh, to unknowingly post bail on behalf of Defendant instead 
of his brother, as intended. Prior to completing the planned 
bail, the scheme was discovered. 
By way of Information, Defendant was charged with 
Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, and Attempted Escape, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309. At 
trial, Defendant's counsel objected to and moved to strike the 
State's witnesses based on various unreliability grounds and the 
circumstances surrounding their voice identification of 
Defendant, which the trial court denied. Further, the record 
indicates that the State failed to establish the elements of the 
charge of Attempted Escape beyond a reasonable doubt. After 
deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both 
counts. 
That same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an 
indeterminate term of on to fifteen years on the charge of 
Communications Fraud, to be served consecutively with any other 
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charges Defendant serves, and one year in jail on the charge of 
Attempted Escape. On March 17, 1999, the trial court signed the 
Judgment, which was entered that same day. Defendant, through 
appointed appellate counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on April 14, 
1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case, among other things, involves questions 
concerning unduly suggestive earwitness identifications 
reliability determinations, or the lack thereof, of earwitness 
testimony utilized at trial (See R. 103-04, Jury Instruction No. 
26). Hence, this case involves questions surrounding the 
constitutional right of an accused to have the trial court 
properly determine the constitutional reliability of earwitness 
identifications prior to consideration of the same by a jury; 
2. While as an inmate at the Davis County Jail, Defendant 
allegedly befriended another inmate, Mr. Calvin Slaugh, and, 
through the course of that relationship, obtained information by 
which Defendant attempted to be released from jail by way of a 
bond (See R. 1-4, Information). Defendant allegedly utilized Mr. 
Slaugh's brother, Mr. Ralph Slaugh, to unknowingly post bail on 
behalf of Defendant instead of his brother, as intended (See id. 
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at R. 2-3); Prior to release, the scheme was discovered (See id. 
at R. 4) ; 
3. By way of Information, Defendant was charged with 
Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, and Attempted Escape, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (See R. 1-
4, Information); 
4. During trial, Defendant's counsel moved to strike the 
testimony of Detective David Bremmer on the grounds that 
Detective Bremmer's identification of Defendant's voice was based 
on a conversation that he overheard between another detective and 
Defendant subsequent to the charges being filed (See R. 171, 
Trial Transcript, Vol. I., pp. 203-04); 
5. Pursuant to the trial court's direction, Defendant's 
trial counsel subsequently filed a motion to strike the testimony 
of Detective David Bremmer because the circumstances surrounding 
the testimony were impermissibly suggestive (See R. 61-62, Motion 
to Strike Testimony of Detective Dave Bremer [sic] Regarding 
Voice Identification). The trial court failed to rule on 
Defendant's motion; 
6. At trial, counsel objected to and moved to strike the 
earwitness identifications of Defendant by various State's 
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witnesses as unduly suggestive and unreliable, which the trial 
court denied (See R. 172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 428-29); 
7. On the charge of Attempted Escape, the trial court 
instructed the jury that 
Before you can convict the defendant 
Joey Luis Silva of the crime of Attempted 
Escape as charged in Count Two of the 
Information, you must believe from the 
evidence and a [sic] beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of August, 
1998, the defendant, Joey Luis Silva, was 
under arrest or in official custody in Davis 
County, State of Utah, and 
2. That he attempted to leave official 
custody without authorization, and 
3. That he did so intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly. 
(See R. 86, Jury Instruction No. 9) (Emphasis added); 
8. At trial, Mr. Todd Harris, the representative of the 
bail bond company, testified that a person using Defendant's name 
contacted him by telephone and arranged to have bail posted for 
Defendant (See R. 171, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 159, lines 2-
19). The caller identified the cosigner of the bond as "Slaugh" 
(See id. at R. 171, p. 159, lines 20-23); 
9. According to Mr. Harris' testimony, Mr. Slaugh called 
and made arrangements to "bail out this Joey Silva." (See id. at 
R. 171, p. 160, lines 5-13) . In light of the evidence presented 
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in the course of the trial, the State failed to establish the 
elements of the charge of Attempted Escape beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 
10. After its deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on both counts (See R. 12 0, Verdict); 
11. That same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 
an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years on the charge of 
Communications Fraud, to be served consecutively with any other 
charges Defendant serves, and one year in jail on the charge of 
Attempted Escape (See R. 121, Judgment and Commitment to the Utah 
State Prison; R. 142, Judgment); 
12. The trial court signed the Judgment on March 17, 1999, 
which was entered that same day (See R. 142, Judgment, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to the Brief of Appellant as 
Addendum A ) ; 
13. Defendant, through appointed appellate counsel, filed 
Notice of Appeal on April 14, 1999 (See R. 147-150, Notice of 
Appeal). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
1. The standards set forth in Ramirez, Lopez, and Long 
should apply to earwitness identification testimony. The trial 
court, in the course of its constitutional determination as to 
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the admissibility of the State's earwitness identification 
testimony, erroneously admitted the voice-identification 
testimony and thereby deprived Defendant of his constitutional 
rights to due process. According to the standards set forth in 
Ramirez, Lopez, and Long, the numerous voice-identifications by 
the law enforcement officers in the instant case are 
constitutionally unreliable and impermissibly suggestive. Hence, 
under the facts of this case, the trial court erred by allowing 
the jury to hear the voice-identification testimony of the 
aforementioned law enforcement witnesses; 
2. By failing to request a cautionary jury instruction 
about the earwitness testimony that reflected the similar factors 
related to eyewitness identification testimony as set forth in 
State v. Long, appointed trial counsel deprived Defendant of his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to request such a cautionary 
jury instruction fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the 
arguments and analogies made by counsel and the trial court 
during trial. But for trial counsel's deficient performance of 
failing to request such a cautionary instruction, Mr. Silva would 
have had the opportunity to have the jury advised about the 
14 
factors it should consider in the course of evaluating earwitness 
identification testimony; 
3. The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish 
Defendant's conviction for Attempted Escape inasmuch as there was 
no evidence presented at trial to establish the element that 
Defendant attempted to leave official custody without 
authorization. Even when the record evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there is not even 
some evidence to establish or support the element that Defendant 
attempted to leave official custody without authorization of the 
jail. Moreover, the State's own evidence establishes that the 
alleged bond that was to be posted was in fact to be in the name 
of Joey Silva. 
ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION: THE APPLICABILITY OF Ramirez AND Lopez 
TO EARWITNESS TESTIMONY AND VOICE 
IDENTIFICATIONS. 
This case presents the apparent issue of first impression of 
whether the standards for determining the reliability and 
suggestiveness of eyewitness identifications as set forth in 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) and State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994), apply to earwitness testimony and 
voice identifications as well. In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme 
15 
Court set forth the procedure to be followed and the factors to 
be considered by a trial court in determining the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony under the due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution.1 Id. at 778-84. In the course of its analysis, 
the Utah Supreme Court provided a broad overview of the law 
surrounding the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, 
which included a discussion about the separate and distinct roles 
of the prosecutor, judge, and jury. Id. at 778. 
As set forth in Ramirez, "[t]he burden of demonstrating the 
admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the prosecution" to 
lay the requisite foundation. Id. Such a foundation is 
necessary for the trial court to make the necessary preliminary 
factual findings and legal conclusions concerning admissibility. 
Id.2 The judge, "as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility 
of an identification," is "required to scrutinize proffered 
evidence for constitutional defects." Id.; see also State v. 
Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). If presented 
with the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness identification, 
the trial judge must preliminariliy determine whether the 
*See Utah Const, art. I, § 7, which provides, "No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
2,,The defendant is entitled to a determination by the court 
of the evidence's constitutional admissibility." State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991). 
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identification is sufficiently reliable so as not to deny the 
accused of due process if considered by the jury. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 778. If admissible, the jury determines the weight to be 
given to such evidence. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the process of discussing the 
roles of the judge and jury, expressed concern about the 
"[p]otential for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional 
guarantees inhere[nt] in th[e] overlap of responsibility of judge 
and jury . . . " Id. Accordingly, the Court emphasized the need 
for the trial court not to "abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to 
carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional 
defects . . . ." Id. Consequently, under Ramirez, the trial 
court must initially determine whether eyewitness testimony is 
constitutionally reliable prior to it being admitted. 
In determining whether an eyewitness identification is 
constitutionally reliable, the trial court must consider the 
following pertinent factors: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view 
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the 
17 
witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary 
one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of 
the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 
1986)) . "The ultimate question to be determined is whether, 
under the totatity of the circumstances, the identification was 
reliable." Id. 
Because essentially the same concerns exist with respect to 
earwitness identification as do in situations involving 
eyewitness identifications, the standards set forth in Ramirez 
should likewise apply to earwitness identifications such as those 
in the instant case. Indeed, the trial court in the instant case 
analogized earwitness identifications to eyewitness 
identifications in the course of its determinations (See, e.g., 
R. 172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 436, lines 7-10). 
In Lopez, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the two-part test 
utilized to determine whether a photo array was so suggestive 
that subsequent admission of eyewitness testimony at trial 
violates federal due process. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111. As the 
court stated, "The first part of the test requires us to 
determine whether the 'pretrial photographic identification 
procedure used . . . was so impermissibly suggestive as to give 
18 
rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.'" Id. (quoting State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 432, 
435 (Utah 1989)). "The second part dictates that if the photo 
array was impermissibly suggestive, any in-court eyewitness 
identification 'must be based on [an] untainted, independent 
foundation to be reliable.'" Id. 
According to the court, xx[i]n evaluating whether a pretrial 
photo identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive under 
the first part of the test, the main question is whether the 
photo array emphasized the defendant's photo over the others." 
Id. Additionally, the court articulated some factors to consider 
in the course of such an evaluation, which include "whether the 
words and body language of the police officers who presented the 
array conveyed an attitude of disinterest, whether the officers 
manipulated the photos to indicate their belief that one of the 
photos portrayed the perpetrator, and whether the photos 
themselves were selected so that the defendant's photo stood out 
from the rest." Id. at 1111-12. 
As the instant case illustrates, the aforementioned Lopez 
two-part test for determining whether a pretrial photo 
identification is unduly suggestive should also apply to pretrial 
voice identifications. At trial, Defendant's trial counsel 
argued that the pretrial voice identification by substantially 
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all of the witnesses in the instant case was unduly suggestive in 
violation of Defendant's due process rights (See, e.g., R. 172, 
Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 428-29). 
I. IN THE COURSE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DETERMINATION 
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EARWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY, THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE VOICE-IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY OF NUMEROUS STATE'S WITNESSES; THEREBY 
DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
TO DUE PROCESS. 
The trial court denied Mr. Silva of his constitutional 
rights to due process by determining that the earwitness 
identification testimony and voice identifications by several of 
the State's witnesses at trial were admissible as a matter of 
law. Earlier in the week just prior to trial in the instant 
case, Detective Bremmer held a conference in the Davis County 
Attorney's Office during which numerous witnesses, who were 
utilized at trial, together listened to various tapes containing 
conversations that purportedly included Mr. Silva (See, e.g., R. 
172, Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 438-39).3 
3As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Defendant's 
appointed trial counsel, pursuant to the trial court's direction, 
filed a motion to strike the testimony of Detective David Bremmer 
as being borne out of circumstances that are impermissibly 
suggestive (See R. 61-62, Motion to Strike Testimony of Detective 
Dave Bremer [sic] Regarding Voice Identification). The trial 
court erred by failing to rule on the motion. 
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Officer John Carter, one of the people present during the 
aforementioned conference, testified on cross-examination that 
Detective Bremmer asked the individuals, in unison, whether they 
could identify the voice on the tapes as that of Joey Silva (See, 
e.g., id. at R. 172, p. 441, lines 16-25). Further, as the tapes 
were played, there were verbal comments and nodding of heads by 
the individuals at the conference, affirming that the voice on 
the tapes was that of Joey Silva (See id. at R. 172, pp. 443-
444) . 
Detective John Fielding, another witness utilized by the 
State at trial to identify the voice of Mr. Silva, was presented, 
prior to trial, with various tapes by Detective Bremmer that 
allegedly contained the voice of Mr. Silva (See id. at R. 172, p. 
453-454). According to Detective Fielding's testimony, the tapes 
presented to Detective Fielding for voice identification purposes 
contained notations on the tapes, "Conversations involving Joey 
Silva" (See id. at R. 172, p. 454, lines 1-9). In fact, 
Detective Fielding essentially acknowledged during his testimony 
that the notations on the tapes suggested that the voice on the 
tapes was that of Mr. Silva (See id. at R. 172, p. 455, lines 19-
23) . 
Another witness utilized by the State to identify the voice 
cf Mr. Silva at trial was Officer Bob Yeaman (See, e.g., id. at 
21 
R. 172, p. 475, lines 12-15) . Officer Yeaman was also present 
during the identification conference at the Davis County 
Attorney's Office (See id. at R. 172, p. 482-83). During his 
testimony outside the presence of the jury, Officer Yeaman 
testified that the individuals present during the conference made 
several unfettered unanimous comments while listening to the 
tapes such as, W[T]hat's Joey" (See id. at R. 172, p. 483-84). 
Additionally, Detective Lon F. Brian, who was also present 
during the previously mentioned voice-identification conference, 
was utilized by the State to identify the voice of Mr. Silva at 
trial (See R. 173, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, pp. 579-600). 
During his testimony outside the presence of the jury, Detective 
Brian testified that he, prior to listening to the tapes, knew 
that the investigation of Detective Bremmer focused on Joey Silva 
(See id. at R. 173, p. 509, lines 9-24). 
The State also utilized the voice-identification testimony 
of Detective Joel Morrison at trial, who was also present at the 
voice-identification conference at the Davis County Attorney's 
Office (See id. at R. 173, pp. 604-08). Detective Morrison 
testified to the trial court that during the voice-identification 
conference, which included the prosecutor and essentially all of 
the law enforcement witnesses in the instant case, all of the 
individuals at the conference talked amongst themselves in the 
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course of making the requested voice identification (See id. at 
R. 173, 4-16). 
According to the standards set forth in Ramirez, Lopez, and 
Long, for that matter, the numerous voice-identifications of the 
law enforcement officers in the instant case are constitutionally 
unreliable and impermissibly suggestive. See State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 493 (Utah 1986)); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 
1994) (quoting State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989)). 
Further, the voice-identifications of substantially all of the 
State's witnesses at trial were tainted by the conference held in 
the Davis County Attorney's Office. Consequently, under the 
facts of this case, the trial court erred by allowing the jury to 
hear the voice-identification testimony of the aforementioned law 
enforcement witnesses. 
II. BY FAILING TO REQUEST A CAUTIONARY JURY 
INSTRUCTION ABOUT THE EARWITNESS TESTIMONY THAT 
ACCURATELY REFLECTS AND ADVISES THE JURY ABOUT THE 
FACTORS OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AS 
SET FORTH IN State v. Long, APPOINTED TRIAL 
COUNSEL DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong 
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test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment4 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 1064. Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To 
prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988); see also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998); accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). *[T]he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 
364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant 
must uxidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the 
circumstances, xshow that counsel's representation fell below an 
4The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence." 
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objective standard of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 
2064 (footnotes omitted); see also Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 
(quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)). A defendant must 
''overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 4 66 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522; Frame, 723 P.2d 
at 405. In the process of arriving at this determination, the 
appellate court ''should consider the totality of the evidence, 
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the 
entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 
25 
P.2d at 187; see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah 
1996) . 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth and discussed the requisite cautionary jury 
instruction to be utilized in cases where eyewitness 
identification is the central issue. Id. at 492, 494 n.8. The 
purpose of such a cautionary instruction is to advise the jury of 
the factors to be considered in course of evaluating eyewitness 
identification testimony. Id. at 492. 
The jury instruction utilized in the instant case concerning 
the voice-identification testimony utilized at trial is deficient 
in many aspects (See R. 103-04, Jury Instruction No. 26). For 
example, the jury instruction in the instant case failed to 
emphasize that the burden is on the State to prove that the 
Defendant is the person who committed the crime. See Long, 721 
P.2d at 494-95 n.8; see also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 
(Utah 1991) (affirmatively citing footnote 8 of State v. Long as 
the cautionary jury instruction). The jury instruction in the 
instant case also fails to list the numerous factors to be 
considered by the jury in determining whether the witness had the 
capacity to observe or hear the person committing the crime. 
Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8 (citing "personal motivations, biases, 
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or prejudices" and whether the witness is of a "different race" 
as factors to be considered). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to request a cautionary 
jury instruction that advised the jury of the concerns 
surrounding voice-identification testimony similar to those of 
eyewitness testimony fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. Appointed trial counsel's 
ineffective assistance of counsel is underscored by trial 
counsel's own arguments throughout the proceedings that 
eyewitness identification testimony is similar to voice 
identification testimony such as that in the instant case (See, 
e.g., R. 172r Vol. II, pp. 428-29). Moreover, the trial court, 
throughout his consideration of the admissibility of the voice-
identification testimony, analogized voice-identification 
testimony to that of eyewitness identification testimony (See, 
e.g., id. at R. 172, p. 436, lines 7-10). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely request a 
cautionary jury instruction similar to that set forth in Long 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment.5 But for trial counsel's deficient performance of 
5The failure to request a cautionary jury instruction is 
exacerbated by the fact that voice identification was the central 
issue in the instant case. See State v. Long, 7321 P.2d 483, 492 
(Utah 1986) . 
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failing to request such a cautionary instruction, Mr. Silva would 
have had the opportunity to have the jury consider the numerous 
factors that should be considered in evaluating voice-
identification testimony. Further, appointed trial counsel's 
failure violates Mr. Silva's due process rights under article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
III. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED 
ESCAPE INASMUCH AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT THAT DEFENDANT 
ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE OFFICIAL CUSTODY WITHOUT 
AUTHORIZATION. 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a 
jury trial, the appellate court views the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the verdict and "assumes the jury believed the evidence and 
inferences that support the verdict." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 
70, 87 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233 
(Utah 1992); State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). In other words, the appellate court will affirm the jury 
verdict w/if there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made.'" Wood, 868 P.2d at 87-88 
(quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)); see 
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also State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert. 
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
"
x
 [d]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient.'" State v Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 
L992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). In the instant 
case, Mr. Silva must marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then 
persuade the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the 
State failed to prove that he was a was guilty of Attempted 
Escape. See State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). "Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or 
supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 
1993) (noting that the State's argument that "speculative 
inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to 
attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its 
core"). 
As set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309, "A person is 
guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without 
29 
authorization." Attempt and its classification as an offense is 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 (1999) & Utah Code Ann. § 
76-4-102 (Supp. 1999). 
The following is the marshaled evidence that supports the 
jury's verdict that Defendant was guilty of Attempted Escape: 
(1) The testimony by Judge Glen R. Dawson concerning the amount 
of Mr. Silva's bail (See R. 171, Trial Transcript, Vol. I., pp. 
30-35) ; (2) The testimony of Detective David Bremmer, the lead 
investigator, concerning his investigation of the case {See id. 
at R. 171, pp. 185-89) ; (3) The testimony of Officer Bob Yeaman 
re procedures and related matters concerning the jail, including 
his voice-identification of Mr. Silva (See id. at R. 171, pp. 41-
141); (4) The testimony of the Slaughs concerning the alleged 
scheme concerning posting of bail for Mr. Silva (See R. 172, 
Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 249-317); (5) The voice-
identification testimony of the numerous law enforcement 
witnesses both outside and in the presence of the jury (See R. in 
passim); and (6) the testimony of the bail bond company owner and 
representative concerning the alleged efforts to post bail on 
behalf of Mr. Silva (See R. 171, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 
143-83; R. 173, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, pp. 622-41). 
Even when the aforementioned evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, there is not even some 
30 
evidence to establish or support the element that Mr. Silva 
attempted to leave official custody without authorization of the 
jail. Moreover, the State's evidence establishes that the 
alleged bond that was to be posted was in fact to be in the name 
of Joey Silva (See id. at R. 171, p. 160, lines 8-18; see also R. 
171 at p. 162, lines 16-23) (bond company representative stating 
that he obtained booking sheet for Joey Silva to post bail bond). 
In light of record and evidence presented at trial, there is 
insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction of 
Attempted Escape. 
As is established by the foregoing evidence at trial, the 
State failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
it is required to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.6 A review 
of the evidence supporting the Attempted Escape conviction leads 
'Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the* offense charged against him is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of 
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words 
"elements of the offense'7 mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition of the 
offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
required. 
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one to the logical conclusion that Defendant's conviction is 
based on conjecture or supposition, which does not constitute 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Reversal of the Attempted 
Escape conviction for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore 
appropriate in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Silva respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his conviction of Communications Fraud and 
Attempted Escape and for such other relief as the Court deems 
just and appropriate under the circumstances presented in this 
case and arguments set forth herein. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Mr. Silva requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the novel and 
apparent issues of first impression in the instant appeal dealing 
with voice-identification testimony. Further, oral argument will 
assist the court in addressing the other issue concerning 
insufficiency of evidence supporting Defendant's conviction of 
Attempted Escape and the constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. These issues present matters requiring 
further development in the area of criminal law for the benefit 
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of the bar and public. Counsel for Mr. Silva also requests that 
the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion 
designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for purposes 
of precedential value and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 2 000 
01LD SNWIGGINS, P .C. 
Wigcptns 
A t t o r n e y £ ^ £ o y D e f e n d a n t / 
A p p e l l a n t 
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Tab A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
MAR 17 10 33 a i l ' 9 9 
Ot \ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOEY LUIS SILVA 
AKA PAUL DANFORTH, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 981701362 
Hon. Darwin C. Hansen, Judge 
The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the 
16th day of November, 1998, the defendant being present in person 
and represented by his attorney, Laura Thompson, the State being 
represented by Carvel R. Harward, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, 
Judge, presiding. 
The defendant having been convicted upon a verdict of 
guilty of the offenses of Communications Fraud, a second degree 
felony, and Attempted Escape, a class A misdemeanor, and the Court 
having asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment 
should not be pronounced; and no sufficient cause to the contrary 
being shown or appearing to the Court; 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the 
offenses of Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, and 
Attempted Escape, a class A misdemeanor, as charged and convicted. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and 
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 
one to fifteen years for the felony, and one year in the Davis 
County Jail to be served at the Utah State Prison for the 
misdemeanor, as provided by law. 
Pursuant to Judgment and Commitment executed by the Court 
on the 16th day of November, 1998, the defendant has been 
transported to the Utah State Prison. It is recommended by the 
Court that the sentence herein ordered for count one run 
consecutively with any other charges at the Utah State Prison and 
that count two run concurrently with count one. 
DATED this / / day of " //£/A>Wi/ 1998 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment 
this day of , 1998, to Laura Thompson, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the most important questions in this case is the identification of the defendant as 
the person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime. If after considering all of the evidence, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
impression by the witnesses. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the 
prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you should consider the following factors in evaluating the testimony of 
each individual witness: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to hear the criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a. The length of time the witness heard the actor, 
b. The distance between the witness and the actor, 
c. Whether the observation was face-to-face, or otherwise, 
d. The presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the 
time spent listening to the actor, 
e. Any physical impairments of the witness affecting his/her ability to 
hear, and 
f. Whether the capacity of the witness to listen and hear the actor was 
impaired by nervousness, fright, confusion, stress, or any other factor. 
2. Was the witness identification of the defendant completely the product of his/her 
memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a. The length of time that passed between the witness' original hearing of the 
actor's voice and his/her identification of the defendant, 
b. The witness' mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the 
identification, 
c. The witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or identifications given by 
other witnesses, to other accounts, or to any other circumstance or influence that 
may have affected the independence of his/her identification, 
d. Any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor's voice 
that is inconsistent with the defendant's voice, and 
e. The circumstances under which the defendant's voice was presented to the 
witness for identification. 
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